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Remorse! Remorse! Remorse! What is this concept that our courts keep referring to in the 
sentencing judgments? It rears its head in a number of important court decisions in South 
Africa and appears to have some kind of effect on the final sentence. The next question which 
came to mind was how a judicial officer identifies remorse and what weight is then attached 
to this particular factor. The writer’s curiosity was piqued on this subject by the recent case of 
Oscar Pistorius.1 
 
The case deserves special mention as it has been a precedent-setting case, it being the first to 
be broadcast live in South Africa and throughout the world. It is a current case that has 
received both international and national attention as the accused is a well-known sports 
figure, famous for his athletic talent around the world. The accused is a double amputee who 
runs on prosthetic blades and is better known as the ‘Blade Runner’.2 The facts briefly were 
as follows:3  On the 14 February 2013 Oscar Pistorius shot and killed his girlfriend, Reeva 
Steenkamp. He was charged with her murder, as well as two counts of contravening section 
120(7) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, relating to the unlawful discharge of a firearm 
in a public place. He was further charged with contravening section 90 of the Firearms 
Control Act 60 of 2000, being in unlawful possession of ammunition without having a license 
or permits to possess the said ammunition. Pistorius was convicted by Judge Masipa on the 
12 September 2014 in the Pretoria High Court of culpable homicide and of contravening 
section 120(3) (b) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, reckless endangerment with a 
firearm, which was unrelated to the main count. Judge Masipa handed down her sentence on 
the 21 October 2014 and sentenced Pistorius to Five years imprisonment in terms of section 
276 (1) (i) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 19774 for culpable homicide and three years’ 
imprisonment for the reckless endangerment with a firearm, to run concurrently. Whilst 
                                                     
1  S v Oscar Leonard Carl Pistorius (GNP) case no CC 13/2013  11& 12 September 2014 unreported. 
2  ‘Oscar Pistorius’ Wikipedia available at http:/en.wikipedia.org.wiki/Oscar_Pistorius, accessed on 29 
November 2014. 
3 Pistorius (note 1 above). 
4 276  (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and any other law and of the common law, the following 
sentences may be passed upon a person convicted of an offence, namely- 
(i)   imprisonment from which such a person may be placed under correctional supervision in the discretion of 
the Commissioner or a parole board 
[Para. (i) added by s. 41 (a) of Act 122 of 1991 and substituted by s. 20 of Act 87 of 1997.].  
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testifying, and furthermore intermittently during the trial the accused cried and retched.5  The 
writer waited patiently to hear the judge’s finding in respect of the issue of remorse. Would 
she have considered his demeanour and behaviour in court as a sign of remorse?  What about 
his apology in open court to the deceased’s family? What about the shocking evidence that 
was led during the sentencing process, that he had been paying money to Steenkamp’s 
parents for a while after the incident? There was also the evidence of his behaviour 
immediately after the incident. The writer will attempt to answer the above questions in the 
conclusion of this paper after having discussed the remorse factor, with an analysis of the 
Pistorius judgment on sentence. 
 
1.2 Aim of the study 
The remorse factor is intriguing. ‘Because of moral condemnation after a crime we ask for 
punishment and expect some kind of remorse.’6  The nexus between morality and punishment 
is where the aspect of remorse finds its root. The main aim of this paper is to determine how 
remorse is identified by a judicial officer and then to evaluate the X factor, that is, the role it 
should play, if any, in the sentencing process. The trend which will be evaluated in further 
discussion in this paper is that the presence of remorse is regarded as a mitigating factor. At 
the same time the counter-argument becomes a point of contention. Does the absence of 
remorse weigh against the accused as an aggravating factor? How do our courts interpret the 
definition of remorse? The writer’s research summarised below, focuses on an examination 
of the case law and the courts’ interpretation of this particular factor as well as various 
academic views of this concept. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
The objective of this paper is to understand the meaning of remorse and its application in the 
sentencing process. The sentencing process clearly has the potential to be inconsistent due to 
the wide discretion afforded to a judicial officer. The study embraces the problems with 




                                                     
5 “As a result of the case being televised, the accused’s emotional distress was broadcast to all viewers.” 
6  T. Vandendriessche , ‘Should we punish a remorseful offender? Punishment within a theory of symbolic 
restoration’ (2014) 33 (2) SAJP 113 
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1.4 Synopsis of Chapters 
This study has been developed through five chapters. Chapter one sets out the background in 
terms of the decision to broach this topic. It then clarifies the aims and objectives of the 
paper. Chapter two is a discussion of punishment generally and the sentencing principles. 
There is further discussion of specific legislation and judicial precedent which provide key 
boundaries in the sentencing process. I then proceed to identify and analyse the various 
definitions of remorse. Remorse is then viewed from a psychological perspective. 
Discussions on empirical studies conducted by Proeve, Tudor and Zhong (refer to chapter 
two) assist the writer in understanding the significance of remorse. An analysis of their work 
provides viable solutions in understanding the application of remorse and the role it plays in 
the criminal process. Chapter three examines the notion of remorse as interpreted in various 
cases. I undertake a study of remorse by looking at the dicta in relevant South African cases. 
This process has enabled the writer to determine how judges identify remorse and what 
actions are regarded as constituting remorse. Chapter four begins with an analysis of the 
remorse factor. The writer then begins to apply the various definitions and arguments in 
respect of remorse to the interpretations applied in the case law. The case law is discussed in 
depth and various arguments proffered as to the role of remorse in the sentencing process, if 
any. The writer takes a brief look at some international cases and the views of judges and 
jurors in other jurisdictions. There are views by Ward7 and Du Toit8 who argue that the 
application of remorse is subjective and should therefore not play any role in the process. The 
writer endorses these views in terms of the strong arguments postulated by them. Chapter five 
encompasses the conclusion and begins with understanding the role of remorse and its 
application. A clear pattern emerges in respect to the application of remorse in our case law, 
including the Pistorius decision. The difficulties with the interpretations and application of 
remorse are highlighted. Possible solutions are advanced in terms of academic views. These 
views are highly recommended as ultimately they will lead to more consistent sentences. 
Remorse is further discussed in terms of its role in the restorative justice process. The 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development state in their publication ‘Restorative 
Justice the road to healing’ (2011) that the ‘restorative justice programmes should create 
space for remorse, the expression of shame, apology, forgiveness, mercy and compassion, but 
should not force these responses to occur.’9 
  
                                                     
7 Ward, BH ‘Sentencing Without Remorse’ (2006) 38 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 131-167. 
8 Du Toit, P ‘The role of remorse in sentencing’ (2013) 34(3) Obiter 558-564. 





HOW DOES REMORSE FUNCTION IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS? 
 
2.1 Punishment and sentencing generally 
Punishment is described in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as the infliction of a 
penalty, or of suffering, on a transgressor.’10  In the legal context it is what is inflicted on an 
accused in a criminal case after he or she has been found guilty of an offence(s). The 
determination of punishment takes place during the sentencing process by a court. The aim of 
sentencing is to punish the wrongdoer. A sentence is any measure applied by a court to the 
person convicted of a crime and which finalises a case.11  Section 276 (1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act12 sets out what types of sentences may be imposed. In terms of this section 
punishment takes many forms including imprisonment, fines, correctional supervision, 
suspended sentence, forfeiture, payment of compensation and community service.13 The list 
is however incomplete as it does not take into account orders such as caution and discharge 
and postponed sentences which also finalise cases.14   The courts may combine the different 
types of punishment when arriving at an appropriate sentence. Our sources of the law of 
sentencing are the common law, statute and judicial precedent.15 
 
The main purposes of punishment that the court will take into account are namely; 
deterrence, prevention, reformation and retribution.16  Deterrence has been said to be one of 
the most important of the purposes of punishment.17  The deterrence factor is twofold. It is 
aimed at not only discouraging the offender, but also other like-minded people, from 
committing crimes. Prevention is aimed at protecting the public from further criminal 
conduct on the part of the offender. This may arise as a result of being incarcerated. 
Reformation aims at rehabilitating the offender and making a better person out of him or 
her.18 Ultimately reformation is aimed at making the offender into a law abiding citizen. 
                                                     
10 SS Terblanche Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 2 ed (2007) 3. 
11 T Geldenhuys et al Criminal Procedure Handbook 11ed (2014) 325. 
12 Act 51 of 1977 Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’. 
13 Terblanche (note 10 above, 4). 
14 Ibid 3. 
15 JR Lund ‘Discretion, principles and precedent in sentencing (part one)’(1979) 3 SACC 204 
16 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 862 A-B;M v The State( Centre for Child Law Amicus Curie) 2007 (12)   
BCLR 1312 (CC) para 109. 
17 Terblanche (note 10 above, 138). 
18 Ibid 163. 
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Retribution is society’s condemnation of the offence.19  Society at large is adversely affected 
by crime and it is for this reason that they want to see the offender punished for what he has 
done. The penalty imposed must reflect the seriousness of the offence and promote a respect 
for the law.20 
 
The South African judiciary enjoys a wide discretion when it comes to the sentencing 
process.21  Innes CJ held in Mapumulo22 ‘The infliction of punishment is pre-eminently a 
matter for the discretion of the trial court.’23  It is trite law that the principles known as the 
‘Zinn triad’24 are applied in exercising this discretion.25  The triad consists of taking into 
account the personal circumstances of the accused, the crime that has been committed and the 
interests of society. Terblanche submits that theoretically the ‘purposes of punishment should 
be dealt with as part of the interests of society component of the Zinn triad.’26  These 
principles do not ‘solve the complex task of weighing, balancing and somehow reconciling 
the often contradictory principles and goals contained in the triad.’27  These principles were 
extended further in the case of S v Rabie28  where it was held that ‘Punishment should fit the 
criminal as well as the crime, be fair to society and be blended with a measure of mercy 
according to the circumstances.’29  In S v Isaacs30  it was stated that the triad laid down in 
Zinn reflects an outmoded view of punishment in that it neglected to take into account the 
specific interests of the victim which might well differ from those of society.31  The courts 
discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily.32 The courts have to act within the limits 
prescribed by the legislature and in accordance with the guidelines laid down by higher 
courts. In this process the personality of the sentencing official also plays an important role.33 
‘Judges are human beings who have their own perceptions and value systems.’34  The facet of 
                                                     
19 Ibid 167. 
20 S v Di Blasi 1996 (1) SACR (A) 10 e-g. 
21 Lund (note 15, 203). 
22 1920 AD 56. 
23 Mapumulo above at 57. 
24 S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 (2) SACR 539, 549 d-e. 
25 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537, 540. 
26 Terblanche (note 10 above; 155). 
27 Lund (note 15 above, 212). 
28 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A). 
29 Rabie para  862G. 
30 S v Isaacs 2002 (1) SACR 176 (C). 
31 Isaacs above 177 B-C. 
32 Geldenhuys et al (note 11above, 326). 
33 Ibid 325. 
34 SJ Morse ‘Commentary: reflections on remorse’ (2014) 42(1) J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 54. 
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considering the personal circumstances of the accused allows for individualisation.35  ‘It 
further allows the court to carefully consider the aggravating and mitigating factors which 
influence the sentence accordingly. This process of individualised justice cannot take place 
without the sentence discretion.’36 Aggravating factors are factors that weigh against the 
accused and may result in a more severe sentence. Examples of aggravating factors are, 
namely, the escalated seriousness of the offence, premeditation, prevalence, previous 
convictions, abuse of trust and, according to some, even a lack of remorse. Mitigating factors 
on the other hand tip the scale in favour of the accused and may result in a less severe 
sentence. Examples of mitigating factors are youthfulness, first time offender, ill health, 
dependants, plea of guilty and remorse. The court has to weigh and balance all factors both 
mitigating and aggravating in arriving at an appropriate sentence. 
 
The court clearly sets out the sentencing principles in S v Samuels37: 
It is trite that the determination of an appropriate sentence requires that proper regard be had to the 
well-known triad of the crime, the offender and the interests of society. After all, any sentence 
must be individualised and each matter must be dealt with on its own peculiar facts. It must also in 
fitting cases be tempered with mercy. Circumstances vary and punishment must ultimately fit the 
true seriousness of the crime. The interests of society are never well served by too harsh or too 
lenient a sentence. A balance has to be struck. 
Each case has to be dealt with in terms of its own merits and its own unique factors. The 
weight attached to every factor and balancing of the sentencing principles will inevitably lead 
to diverse outcomes. Section 274 (1) of the Act38  provides:  
A court may, before passing sentence, receive such evidence as it thinks fit in order to inform itself 
as to the proper sentence to be passed. 






                                                     
35 S v Scheepers 1977 (2) SA 155 (A) 158 G-H. 
36 Terblanche (note10 above; 120). 
37 2011(1) SACR 9 SCA. 
38 note 12 above. 
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2.1.1 Minimum sentence legislation 
Section 51 to 53 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act39, which came into effect on the 1st 
May 1998, prescribe the minimum sentence a judicial officer must  impose in serious 
offences for example murder, robbery and rape. This legislation was amended again in 2007 
by the Criminal Law Amendment Act.40  The court must act within the limits prescribed by 
the Legislature if the accused is convicted in terms of those specific sections. The enactment 
of the minimum sentence legislation was in effect addressing society’s attitude towards 
serious offences. For instance, if convicted of premeditated murder or rape where aggravating 
factors, as set out in the section, are involved, life imprisonment is prescribed.41  Section 
51(3) (a) sets out the approach the court has to adopt when passing sentences prescribed by 
the minimum sentence legislation. It reads as follows: 
‘(a) If any court referred to in subsection (1) or (2) is satisfied that substantial and compelling 
circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the sentence prescribed in 
those subsections, it shall enter those circumstances on the record of the proceedings and may 
thereupon impose such lesser sentence’.  
In S v Abrahams 42  the court held: 
The prescribed sentences the Act contains play a dual role in the sentencing process. Where factors 
of substance do not compel the conclusion that the application of the prescribed sentence would be 
unjust, that sentence must be imposed. However, even where such factors are present, the 
sentences the Act prescribes create a legislative standard that weighs upon the exercise of the 
sentencing court's discretion. This entails sentences for the scheduled crimes that are consistently 
heavier than before.43 
The approach that the courts have to adopt is that the prescribed minimum sentences ought to 
be imposed. However the courts must take into account the personal circumstances of the 
accused as well as the circumstances present during the commission of the offence in the 
search for substantial and compelling circumstances which would justify the court imposing a 
lesser sentence than the one prescribed by the act. The court has a duty to consider all 
circumstances both mitigating and aggravating cumulatively and then consider if it justifies a 
departure from the prescribed minimum sentence. In S v Malgas44 the Supreme Court of 
                                                     
39 105 of 1997 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘minimum sentence legislation’. 
40 Act 105 of 2007. 
41 Section 51 (1) Part 1 of Schedule 2. 
42 2002 (1) SACR 116 (SCA). 
43 Abrahams above 126. 
44 2001(1) SACR 469 (SCA).  
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Appeal held that the specified sentences should not be ‘departed from lightly and for flimsy 
reasons.’45 Terblanche argues that the ‘current minimum sentence legislation has worsened 
the disparities and inconsistencies’ in the sentencing process.46  In S v Dodo 47  the 
Constitutional Court confirmed the constitutionality of the minimum sentence legislation. 
The court found that proportionality between the seriousness of the offence and the extent of 
the punishment goes to the ‘heart of the inquiry as to whether punishment is cruel, inhuman 
or degrading.’48  This was with reference to section 12 of the Constitution49  which provides: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person which includes the right - 
 (e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. 
 
Our Constitution accordingly protects the rights of an offender not to be punished or 
sentenced in a way that would amount to ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading’ punishment. When 
passing sentences judicial officers should ensure that they refrain from infringing on this 
right. If the courts apply the proportionality test as set out in the dictum of the Dodo case it 
will minimise unjust sentences. 
 
2.1.2 Judicial precedent 
The court must also be guided by the decisions of higher courts. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal in the case of S v Xaba50  held that the sentences imposed in previous cases, namely 
judicial precedent provide useful guidelines. Conradie JA added in Xaba ‘It has often been 
pointed out that no two cases are alike and this is self-evidently true, but the fact remains that 
courts must strive for some consistency in punishment….’51  However the court in S v 
Jimenez 52   confirmed that the circumstances of each crime vary and that other sentences can 
be no more than ‘guides’, it nevertheless stressed that these guides should be used, in 
conjunction with other relevant considerations, to determine an appropriate sentence.53 
 
                                                     
45 Malgas above para 25. 
46 SS Terblanche ‘Sentencing guidelines for South Africa: lessons from elsewhere’(2003) 120 (4) SALJ 881. 
47 2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC). 
48 Dodo para 37-38. 
49 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution). 
50 2005 (1) SACR 435. 
51 Xaba above para 15. 
52 2003 (1) SACR 507 (A). 
53 SS Terblanche ‘Rape sentencing with the aid of sentencing guidelines’ (2006)XXXIX CILSA 31. 
9 
 
In R v Karg54  Schreiner JA observed that ‘while the deterrent effect of punishment has 
remained as important as ever, the retributive aspect has tended to yield ground to the aspects 
of prevention and correction.’55  It is apposite to remember that when a court imposes 
punishment the task is somewhat different to the one which is exercised when dealing with 
the merits of the matter. It was stated by Beyers JA in Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In Re R v 
Berger and another ‘It is rightfully said that after conviction the judge is in another sphere 
where the imposition of the punishment must be accompanied by judicious mercy and 
humanity in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the case.’56 
 
In the case of S v Martin 57  Flemming DJP held the following: 
A Court of law is not a court of perfection. As the word ‘judgment’ indicates, the Court’s order 
represents an evaluation. It is not a scientific calculation. Sentence cannot be objectively measured 
and then snipped off in correct lengths. It can never have perfect concurrence from all members of 
the community. But if confidence is not reposed in the Court, if it’s image is tarnished in the mind 
of the public, if the role of the court as the community’s own arm dedicated to the making of 
assessments is not brought home to the public, the country will be brought even closer to the chaos 
to which it is already so close. It is a matter of regret that so many influential people, and no 
occupation is excluded, often show inadequate insight into the need to build confidence in the 
Courts. They do their country a disservice. 58 
This judgment aptly confirms that the duty of the court is to evaluate all the evidence and 
then apply the sentencing principles, namely, the crime, and the personal circumstances of the 
accused and the interests of society in arriving at an appropriate sentence. There is no 
mathematical calculation or formula that would lead to the perfect sentence. The court takes 
into account factors that may mitigate or aggravate a sentence. Sometimes a factor may have 
no effect on the final sentence. ‘The effect of every relevant factor is determined by the 
judicial officer in the exercise of his sentence discretion.’59  A judicial officer uses intuitive 
synthesis in determining an appropriate sentence. What is important is trying to attain a 
balance of the principles in the triad as Miller JA held in S v Khulu:60  
                                                     
54 1961 (1) SA 231 (A). 
55 Karg above 263 A. 
56 Berger 1936 (AD) 334, 341 “(my translation)”. 
57 1996(2) SACR 378. 
58 Martin 382 para E-G. 
59 Terblanche (note 10 above; 185). 
60 1975 (2) SA 518 (N). 
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just as a court should not, in an excess of compassion or pity, show a criminal convicted of a 
serious or prevalent type of crime, undue leniency at the best interests of society, so it should not 
by over-zealous protection of society denigrate the concepts of justice and fairness in relation to 
the individual offender.61 
In this dictum the judge confirms the importance of balancing the triad and not over 
emphasizing any one principle in favour of another. 
 
2.2 Identifying remorse 
Remorse is defined in the New Oxford Dictionary of English62  as ‘deep regret or guilt for a 
wrong committed’. The online Your Dictionary sets out examples of sentences using the 
word remorse:63 
 He had remorse for the death of his former friend, and later came here on a pilgrimage. 
 There was no remorse in his face or tone. 
 Why doesn’t he show more remorse for the murdered, innocent Iraqis? 
 Another held him accountable, with remorse causing him to take his own life.  
 Similar to Brady, there was no remorse in his admittance, and her throat tightened. 
 All the piled up stress and remorse bubbled up and she was suddenly and thoroughly 
consumed with seething rage. 
 Haunted by remorse and jarred by rumours of his wife’s infidelities, Justin surprises himself 
by plunging headlong into a dangerous odyssey.  
 It was that night, in deep remorse, Van Gogh famously cut off part of his own ear. 
 
Wikipedia defines remorse as: 
An emotional expression of personal regret felt by a person after they have committed an act 
which they deem to be shameful, hurtful or violent. Remorse is closely allied to guilt and self-
directed resentment. When a person regrets an earlier action or failure to act, it may be because of 
remorse or in response to various other consequences, including being punished for the act or 
omission.64 
 
Remorse may be defined as moral or emotional distress resulting from past transgressions.65  
                                                     
61 Khulu above 522. 
62 New Oxford Dictionary of English 1998. 
63 http://sentence.yourdictionary.com/remorse,accessed on the 21 October 2014. 
64 ‘Remorse’ Wikipedia available at http:/en.wikipedia.org.wiki/Remorse, accessed on 7 November 2014. 
65  EP Corwin et al ‘Defendant remorse, need for affect, and juror sentencing decisions’ (2012) 40 (1) J Am 
Acad Psychiatry Law 41. 
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How do our courts interpret the definition of remorse? In assessing the case law in South 
Africa it has been noted that remorse is a factor that the court considers in the sentencing 
process. In S v Seegers 66   Rumpff JA held that ‘remorse, as an indication that the offence 
will not be committed again, is an important consideration, in suitable cases, when the 
deterrent effect of a sentence on the accused is adjudged.’67 Some courts link the presence of 
remorse with the prospect of the rehabilitation of the offender.68  
 
The sentencing process is not an easy task and to alleviate the issues of inconsistency the 
South African Law Commission recommended that a Council be established which would 
provide some guidance for our courts.69  Sentencing guidelines are ultimately aimed at 
consistency70 and its effect will be to reduce disparities. One of the important 
recommendations is the assessment of the seriousness of the offence. This must be 
determined by the ‘degree of harmfulness (or risk of harmfulness) of the offence and the 
degree of culpability of the offender.’71  Despite their recommendations these guidelines have 
not been made into law as yet. Many States in America have prescriptive sentencing 
guidelines that ensure that sentences handed down by the courts are consistent.72 
 
Section 9 of our Constitution sets out the right to equality: 
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law73 
It is therefore the duty of our courts to ensure that factors like remorse if they are going to be 
weighed into the equation should be applied consistently in accordance with the principles of 
justice and fairness. The court held in Director of Public Prosecutions v Mngoma:74  ‘For a 
sentence to be appropriate it must be fair to both the accused and society. Such a sentence 




                                                     
66 1970 (2) SA 506 (A). 
67 Seegers 511 G-H. 
68 Du Toit (note 8 above, 558). 
69 Report: Sentencing (A new sentencing framework): Project 82 (2000). 
70 Terblanche (note 46 above, 859). 
71 Clause 3 (2) (note 69 above). 
72  Example Minnesota guidelines, Terblanche (note 46, 861.) 
73 The Constitution. 
74 2010 (1) SACR 427 (SCA). 
75 Mngoma above Para [13]. 
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2.3 Remorse in a psychological context 
Proeve and Tudor76  examine remorse and the emotions related to remorse, namely: regret, 
guilt and shame.77  The authors state that the ‘scholarly discussion of this emotion suggests 
that remorse is relatively difficult to distinguish from other emotions, as remorse is 
commonly described in terms of other emotions.’78  Studies done by Proeve in 2001 have 
been able to verify that there is clearly a relationship between remorse, regret and guilt.79 
When an individual confesses, thereby accepting full responsibility and blame, the adverse 
actions directed towards that person are reduced.80 
Two studies on apologizing are "The Five Languages of Apology" by Gary Chapman and Jennifer 
Thomas, and "On Apology" by Aaron Lazare. These studies indicate that effective apologies that 
express remorse typically include a detailed account of the offense; acknowledgment of the hurt or 
damage done; acceptance of the responsibility for, and ownership of, the act or omission; an 
explanation that recognizes one’s role. As well, apologies usually include a statement or 
expression of regret, humility or remorse; a request for forgiveness; and an expression of a credible 
commitment to change or a promise that it will not happen again. Apologies may also include 
some form of restitution, compensation or token gesture in line with the damage that you caused.81 
Most psychologists regard remorse as a primary component of the guilt experience.82  The 
emotions of shame and guilt may be an important stepping stone in the rehabilitation 
process.83  Zhong et al84  have conducted studies by interviewing twenty three judges to 
examine their views on remorse. 
The results showed that the judges varied widely in their opinions on the way remorse should be 
assessed and its relevance in judicial decision-making. They agreed that the relevance of remorse 
varied by type of crime and the stage of the proceedings. The indicators of remorse for some 
judges were the same as those that indicated the lack of remorse for others.85 
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 The judges were given a definition of remorse adapted from Proeve and Tudor86: 
Remorse may be defined as a distressing emotion that arises from acceptance of personal 
responsibility for an act of harm against another person. Often, with further reflection, the 
remorseful individual may desire that the act had never occurred at all and wish to make restitution 
toward the victim.87 
 
In summarizing Zhong’s research, the judges were asked their opinion of the above 
definition and further questions on their legal experience with the remorse factor. They were 
also asked to evaluate ‘genuine versus feigned remorse’.88  The analysis of the data was done 
using qualitative methodology. Beyond that the study was a clear indicator that the 
application of remorse in the sentencing process is inconsistent. Some judges even regarded 
remorse as irrelevant. The judges also had diverse views on the absence of remorse and its 
effect in the sentencing process. Many of the judges agreed that a guilty plea was indicative 
of remorse. Some judges discussed the difficulty they had in distinguishing the genuine 
remorse from the feigned remorse. There were clear differences as to the indicators they used 
to identify real remorse from the fakers.  
 
2.4 The significance of remorse as a factor in sentencing 
The researchers concluded from the above exercise that all the participants recognized the 
relevance of the study in trying to assess the role of remorse. The judges were also keen on 
the idea of ‘forensic psychiatric assessments’89  where skilled psychiatrists would evaluate 
the accused and be able to professionally assess the aspect of remorse. Zhong has conceded 
in his article that the study was limited in terms of the method used and that the research was 
only conducted in one state.  
 
Stephen J Morse90  writes an interesting commentary on Zhong’s article above. He 
commends the authors for accepting the limitations in respect of their research methodology 
but reiterates the importance of evaluating the concept of remorse. He states that ‘remorse is a 
distinctively moral reaction.’91  He further states that Zhong’s definition of remorse reflects 
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the ‘desire to make restitution,’92  which would be the natural outcome of the feeling of 
remorse. However he says that restitution ‘does not seem to be part of the remorse itself.’ He 
is accordingly critical of the definition given to the judges by Zhong and others and submits 
that this may have accounted for the varied responses. Morse goes on to state that the only 
justification for remorse in Anglo-American penal law is ‘general deterrence, specific 
deterrence and incapacitation.’93 
The question concerning the effect of remorse on consequential justifications is empirical. Does 
remorse or its absence validly predict whether the offender is less or more dangerous and thus 
should receive a lesser or greater sentence (holding every other variable constant)? When remorse 
is used for mitigation, the consequential goals may lead to inconsistent results. Remorse that leads 
to lesser sentences because remorseful defendants are less likely to recidivate may also have the 
effect of undermining general deterrence, because the criminal law may be seen as soft or easy to 
manipulate by faked emotions. If lack of remorse is associated with enhanced danger of 
recidivism, then general and special prevention would both be achieved by lengthening the 
sentences of such offenders. [ A]ssuming  that we can accurately judge when remorse is genuine 
and what its depth and quality are, as Zhong et al. rightly note, the consequential outcomes of 
using remorse are almost entirely speculative.94 
He proceeds to submit that the inability to conclusively judge the role of remorse is largely 
due to a lack of research and data. Emily Corwin95  confirmed that ‘despite the importance of 
remorse in sentencing, there are minimal empirical data on the nature of remorse and the 
mechanisms by which it is linked to sentencing.’ Morse suggests that currently there is no 
justification for remorse to be considered in the meting out of punishment.96  He agreed with 
Zhong that if remorse is going to be a factor to be taken into account then there would be a 
need for the use of forensic psychiatrists. The psychiatrists would be able to ‘identify whether 
an offender is in fact remorseful’ and to conduct research ‘to determine whether remorse is a 
valid indicator of one or more of the consequential justifications of punishment’.97  However 
forensic psychiatrists would have to tread carefully as they are not specifically trained to 
evaluate remorse. 
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It is abundantly clear from his article that the role of remorse varies and results in 
inconsistencies in its application. What is required is further study that would assist the 
judiciary in making informed decisions in respect of the presence or absence of remorse. 
Morse concedes that because discretion plays a huge part in the sentencing process sentences 
will be individualised. Research and studies like the above could make a difference in 







UNPACKING REMORSE AS THE X FACTOR: WHAT IT IS AND HOW THE 
COURTS APPLY THE FACTOR GENERALLY 
 
A study of the case law revealed to the writer that our courts identified remorse as a factor 
under the following broad categories, namely, full disclosure and openness, conduct of an 
accused and pleading guilty. An understanding of the counter argument expressed in other 
cases allowed the writer to categorise cases in which the court found there was an absence of 
remorse. This has allowed for a holistic perspective in understanding the role of remorse in 
the sentencing process. 
 
3.1 Full disclosure and openness  
In S v Seegers, the appellant was convicted in the Northern Cape Division of being in 
possession of 605 uncut diamonds, to the value of R7574. He was sentenced to a fine of 
R5000 or two years’ imprisonment and, in addition, to five years’ imprisonment of which two 
years were suspended on conditions. The Appellate Division held that where an accused 
pleads guilty to the crime and has made a full disclosure of details and there has been 
openness on his part, that ‘such conduct can demonstrate penitence and remorse which in the 
circumstances of the case is an important consideration and does justify a more lenient 
sentence than usual.’98  The appeal court has accordingly indicated that a guilty plea together 
with ‘openness’ and ‘full disclosure’ is a sign of remorse. The appeal court further held that 
the appellant’s admission of guilt was only made when he saw that the detectives were going 
to arrest not only him, but Zahlan and Sloof, his associates. 
 
In S v Morris99  the appellant, a British national, had pleaded guilty to and been convicted on 
three counts of purchasing rough and uncut diamonds in contravention of Section 84.100   He 
was sentenced by the High Court to nine months imprisonment on each count. He appealed 
his sentence. During his mitigation of sentence he did not testify himself but called two 
witnesses. One of them was his father, who testified that the accused was filled with remorse. 
Wessels JA quoted the dictum of Rumpff JA in Seeger’s case in respect to the remorse factor. 
The court held: 
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The appellant’s plea of guilty is equivocal on the question of contrition - the case against him was 
so overwhelming that, even if he did not appreciate that it was so, he would most certainly have 
been advised by his counsel that that was indeed the case. The appellant chose not to enter the 
witness-box and neglected the opportunity of taking the Court a quo fully into his confidence, so 
as to have enabled that Court to assess the sincerity of his show of penitence and remorse. It was 
not sufficient for him to have satisfied his father that that was so; it was his plain duty to satisfy the 
Court by himself giving evidence, which could be tested by cross-examination.101 
The court was unable to determine the degree of remorse as the appellant failed to testify and 
take the court fully into his confidence. 
 
In S v Martin102  the facts were that the appellant was charged with four counts of murder and 
two counts of attempted murder and one count of contravening section 2 and section 36 of the 
Arms and Ammunition Act103  for possession of the firearm and ammunition used to commit 
the murders. He pleaded guilty to all counts and was accordingly convicted. On the day of the 
offences he had gone to his in-laws house to see his children with the intention to see them 
and then commit suicide. He was in a depressed state and under the influence of alcohol. He 
was well aware that he was not allowed in the house. He was confronted by his father in law 
who smacked him. He shot and killed his father-in-law. He thereafter killed three more 
people and attempted to murder his two sisters-in-law. The accused was thirty years old and a 
first offender, who had acted without self-control. In assessing the seriousness of the offence 
the judge correctly stated that an important question that needed an answer was ‘Why did you 
do it?’104  The court is only able to test the degree of ‘moral reprehensibility’105 if the accused 
himself testifies and answers that question. Counsel for the appellant argued that by pleading 
guilty the accused showed remorse for his actions. The appellant’s section 112 plea stated 
that the accused regretted his actions. The court held:  
For the purposes of sentence, there is a chasm between regret and remorse. The former has no 
necessary implication of anything more than simply being sorry that you have committed the deed, 
perhaps with no deeper roots than the current adverse consequences to yourself. Remorse connotes 
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repentance, an inner sorrow inspired by another’s plight or by a feeling of guilt, e.g. because of 
breaking the commands of a higher authority.106  
The degree of contrition on the part of the accused is accordingly relevant in the meting out 
of punishment.107 The court clearly distinguishes between ‘regret’ and ‘remorse’ and finds 
that many people may “regret” their actions, but this is far from remorse.108  The court 
accepted that in terms of the expert’s evidence there was a ‘component of true remorse’ but 
was unable to quantify this factor as the accused did not testify. The court held that the 
sentence of life imprisonment was inappropriate and cruel and sentenced the appellant to an 
effective 25 years’ imprisonment on all counts. 
 
In the case of S v Kgantsi109  the appellant was convicted and sentenced on charges of 
murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances, kidnapping, unlawful possession of a 
firearm and unlawful possession of ammunition. The facts briefly were as follows: The main 
witness for the State had been travelling with another person (‘the deceased’) at night, when 
they stopped to give a hitchhiker, namely, the appellant a lift. At some point during the 
journey, the appellant asked to alight from the vehicle and, in the process of alighting, the 
appellant drew a firearm and shot the deceased in the head. He took certain items from the 
person of the deceased, and released the State witness after the latter begged to be freed. The 
court granted leave to appeal against the sentence in respect of the murder, robbery with 
aggravating circumstances and kidnapping. The appellant pleaded guilty to the robbery and 
unlawful possession of firearm and ammunition. The court found in respect of the issue of 
remorse as follows: 
There is a distinct absence of remorse on the appellant's part, notwithstanding his plea of guilty on 
some of the offences. His lack of contrition is manifested by his untruthful plea explanation and 
testimony in respect of the murder – both directly at odds with his confession before the 
magistrate. I am of the view that the appellant should be afforded the benefit of remorse as 
mitigating factor only to a very limited extent on the aggravated robbery charge, to which he had 
pleaded guilty. Genuine remorse in respect of this and the other charges would have entailed the 
appellant taking the trial court into his confidence so that it could have: “. . . a proper appreciation 
of, inter alia: what motivated the accused to commit the deed; what has since provoked [his] 
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change of heart and whether [he] does indeed have a true appreciation of the consequences of 
those actions.”110 
Despite pleading guilty the court was only able to attach limited weight to the remorse factor. 
The appellant had lied in his plea explanation and failed to take the court fully into his 
confidence. Genuine remorse is assessed in terms of the enquiry as laid out in the dictum of 
Matyityi’s case.111 
 
3.2 Conduct of the Accused 
In S v Brand112  the court held that genuine remorse must be distinguished from self-pity and 
unavoidable acknowledgement of guilt.113  The facts briefly were as follows. The appellant 
pleaded guilty to 200 counts of fraud in the magistrate’s court. He was duly convicted and the 
matter was referred to the Regional Court for sentence. The appellant was employed by a 
bank. He fraudulently forged the signatures of his clients and withdrew their money. The sum 
of R240 675, 24 was fraudulently withdrawn by the appellant to the loss and prejudice of his 
employer. The mitigating factors were inter alia; the accused was 35 years old and he had a 
dependant, nine year old daughter; he had no previous convictions and had a stable 
employment history; he had lost his employment after the incident; and he had done 
everything in his power to pay the money back to the bank and even sold off assets. The 
appellant testified in mitigation of sentence that he was remorseful for what he had done. The 
magistrate dismissed his remorse as mere self-pity. The appellant was sentenced to seven 
years’ imprisonment, two years of which was suspended for a period of five years. In 
addition, the appellant was ordered in terms of section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977 to repay the amount of R240 675, 24, plus interest, to the bank. 
 
With reference to the issue of remorse, the appeal court held that true remorse was an 
important factor in the imposition of sentence, as it suggested an offender who, firstly, 
realised that he had done wrong, and, secondly, undertook not to transgress again. True 
remorse led to accommodating punishment by our courts. The court held further, that the 
conduct of the appellant in casu, who had reinforced his protestations of contrition by his 
actual deeds, suggested true remorse. This appeared from his attempts to increase his income 
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in order to more quickly discharge his obligation to the bank, from the sale of his assets to 
pay the bank, and from his plea of guilty. The court went on to find that the trial court had 
erred in doubting the genuineness of the appellant’s remorse and in not according it sufficient 
weight. Accordingly the court of appeal was at liberty to interfere with the sentence imposed. 
The appeal court imposed a sentence of five (5) years imprisonment subject to the provisions 
of 276 (1) (i) of the Act. 
 
In the case of De Sousa v S 114  the appellant pleaded guilty to 13 counts of fraud and was 
sentenced to seven and a half year of imprisonment in the trial court. The appeal court found 
that the following factors were a sign of genuine remorse; once discovered she immediately 
undertook to repay the money and signed an acknowledgement of debt; she co-operated fully 
with the police from the outset and gave a detailed statement outlining her involvement with 
her co-perpetrator. At the time of the sentence she had settled all monies that she was liable 
for to the complainant. The Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the sentence of the trial court 
and substituted it with a sentence of four (4) years imprisonment. 
 
S v De Klerk115  is an example of facts where the court accepted that the appellant was really 
remorseful. The facts briefly were as follows: The accused was 39 years old and a first 
offender. He pleaded guilty to three (3) counts of indecent assault on young girls. He was 
convicted in the Regional Court and sentenced to an effective thirty (30) years’ 
imprisonment. The appeal court accepted the evidence of a clinical psychologist, an expert 
witness called by the defence. Dr R testified that the appellant understood that what he had 
done was wrong and that he felt remorse and a strong sense of guilt for his behaviour. The 
court held that the appellant had shown remorse and had acted on his remorse and taken steps 
to seek help. The appeal court further criticized the regional magistrate’s decision as he 
showed a bias towards the punitive and deterrent aspects of sentencing. The expert’s 
testimony clearly showed that the appellant was capable of rehabilitation. The sentence of the 
regional court was set aside and replaced with a sentence of three years’ correctional 
supervision in terms of section 276 (1) (h) of the Act116 on conditions and a further five 
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years’ imprisonment wholly suspended for five years, on condition that the accused is not 
convicted of the offence of rape or indecent assault committed during the period of 
suspension. 
 
In the case of M v S (Centre for Child Law as amicus curiae)117  the facts were as follows: 
The appellant was thirty five years old, single and a mother of three boys aged 16, 12 and 8. 
She had two previous convictions for fraud and was charged again with fraud. While out on 
bail after having been in prison for a short period she committed a further fraud. In 2002 she 
was convicted in the Wynberg Regional Court on 38 counts of fraud and four counts of theft. 
The court took all the counts together for purposes of sentence. The total amount involved 
came to R29 158, 69. She was sentenced to four years’ direct imprisonment. After an appeal 
to the high court her sentence was converted to imprisonment in terms of section 276 (1) (i) 
of the Act. The Constitutional Court granted her leave to appeal her sentence only. The main 
issue the court had to deal with was how section 28 of the Constitution118  affected the triad 
and whether the sentencing of a caregiver required an isolated enquiry. The court held that 
although the best interests of the child are paramount, this did not mean that they are 
absolute, and could be limited by balancing them against other rights in the Bill of Rights. 
With regards to the factor of remorse the court held the following: 
[T]he level of remorse of an accused has been recognised as one of the many factors to be 
considered by a sentencing court. The court in Hamilton119  looked at the manner in which the 
accused demonstrated real remorse when deciding upon a sentence. Notably this can be compared 
to the case before us where the applicant has adopted a supercilious attitude without any sign of 
remorse whatsoever and continued to commit further offences whilst on bail with the full 
knowledge of the impact that such callous action would have on her children. It is remarkable that 
even when she was in prison, the applicant continued to plan further acts of fraud. The applicant’s 
lack of remorse in this case arises from her recidivism.120 
 
In S v Truyens121   the appellant was convicted of theft of 48 head of cattle from his employer. 
He was sentenced in the Regional Court to four years imprisonment in terms of section 
276(1) (i). He appealed his sentence and the High Court increased same to twelve years’ 
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imprisonment of which four years were conditionally suspended. He then appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal against the further increase of sentence. It was held: 
the court accepted the following conduct to be indicative of T’s remorse: he changed his plea 
during the trial; he did not put up a false version in an attempt to evade responsibility; he wrote a 
letter to his employer before his first appearance in court, confessing to the crime and expressing 
the hope that he would now get the chance to change his life; he promised to compensate his 
employer for the loss and succeeded in paying R20 000 in two instalments (at para 13). The 
forensic criminologist who compiled a pre-sentence report testified that this conduct was 
consistent with remorse, because it demonstrated T’s insight into the harm that he had caused. 
Cachalia JA found the presence of remorse to be an important distinguishing factor from the 
comparative precedent cited by the High Court.122 
 
3.3 Plea of Guilty 
In S v Assante123 the appellant was convicted of 108 counts of fraud to the loss of R345 
million. He was a 50 year old divorcee and the father of two daughters. He had no previous 
convictions. He did not directly benefit from the fraud. The court a quo sentenced him to 15 
years’ imprisonment on each count, all except one to run partially concurrently. His sentence 
was an effective 24 years’ imprisonment. The appellant appealed his sentence on the basis 
that it was startlingly inappropriate. The appeal court held that the court a quo had generously 
taken into account that the appellant’s guilty plea was a sign of remorse. The appeal was 
accordingly dismissed.  
 
In the case of S v Bercensie124  the appellant had pleaded guilty to the offences of robbery 
with aggravating circumstances and rape, and had been convicted on the basis of his plea. He 
was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment in respect of the robbery and life imprisonment in 
respect of the rape. It was argued on appeal that his personal circumstances and the remorse 
that he expressed were substantial and compelling circumstances to justify less severe 
sentences than those prescribed by the Criminal Law Amendment Act.125 
All that is left of the personal circumstances relied upon by the appellant is remorse, expressed in 
three forms. First, in his Section 112 statement, the appellant said that he was sorry for what he had 
done. Secondly, it is argued that his plea of guilty was a sign of his remorse. Thirdly, it is also 
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argued that his willingness to testify against his accomplice is also a sign of remorse. I accept that 
the appellant has shown that he is remorseful but that on its own does not necessarily mean that a 
deviation from the prescribed sentences is justified. The appellant’s remorse must, like every other 
factor relevant to sentence, be considered in the light of all of the facts. It must also be viewed in 
the light of why remorse is a mitigating factor: its relevance lies in it being an indication that the 
offender has the potential for rehabilitation because a truly remorseful offender is unlikely ever to 
repeat the crime.126 
The court held that the ‘remorse expressed by the appellant paled in its significance’ when 
viewed in the context of all of the factors relevant to sentence, particularly the seriousness of 
the offences. The appeal was dismissed and the sentences were confirmed. 
 
In S v Matyityi the court held that there must be some factual basis for a court to make a 
finding of remorse. The facts briefly were that the respondent was convicted of one count 
each of murder and rape, and on two counts of rape. He was sentenced to 25 years’ 
imprisonment on each of the first two counts and to 13 years’ on each of the rape charges. 
The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The state appealed the sentences on the first 
two counts on the basis that they were too lenient. Ponnan JA held as follows: 
[R]emorse was said to be manifested in him pleading guilty and apologising through his 
counsel…. It has been held, quite correctly, that a plea of guilty in the face of an open and shut 
case against an accused is a neutral factor. (S v Barnard 2004 (1) SACR 191 (SCA) 197) The 
evidence linking the Respondent to the crimes was overwhelming. In addition to the stolen items 
found at the home of his girlfriend, there was DNA evidence linking him to the crime scene, 
pointings- out made by him, and his positive identification at an identification parade. There is, 
moreover a chasm between regret and remorse. Many accused persons might well regret their 
conduct, but that does not without more translate to genuine remorse. [S v Volkwyn supra] In 
order for the remorse to be a valid consideration, the penitence must be sincere and the accused 
must take the court fully into his or her confidence. [Seegers supra] Until and unless that happens, 
the genuineness of the contrition alleged to exist cannot be determined. After all, before a court 
can find that an accused person is genuinely remorseful, it needs to have a proper appreciation of, 
inter alia: what motivated the accused to commit the deed; what has since provoked his or her 
change of heart; and whether he or she does indeed have a true appreciation of the consequences of 
those actions.127 
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In the case of S v Thole 128  the appellant was convicted in a Regional Court of rape and 
murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment on each count. He had pleaded guilty and his 
written statement in terms of section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 129  indicated that 
he stabbed the deceased after he had raped her. Counsel for the appellant argued that the 
following were substantial and compelling circumstances which would allow the court to 
deviate from the prescribed sentence. These factors had to be viewed cumulatively, 
namely, the appellant was 26 years of age at the time of commission of the offences; he was 
single and had no children; his highest level of education was a standard six; he was raised by 
his grandmother; that he was remorseful for what he had done; that he had been drinking 
before the incident; and that he was a first offender.130  The court found that the court a quo 
had properly taken into account these factors and had further carefully applied the principles 
laid down in the triad in considering the seriousness of the offence and the interests of the 
community. The court had correctly found that the aggravating factors far outweighed 
the mitigating circumstances. In his plea the accused had failed to provide reasons for killing 
the deceased. The evidence against the accused was overwhelming and included DNA 
evidence. ‘A plea of guilty under such circumstances cannot, without more, be considered to 
be indicative of his contrition.’131 Molemela J held that ‘genuine contrition cannot be 
assumed, it must be demonstrated.’ The accused’s guilty plea was insufficient and the court 
could not test the degree of his remorse as he had failed to testify in mitigation of sentence. 
On appeal the accused was sentenced to ten years’ for the rape and life imprisonment for the 
murder, both counts to run concurrently. 
 
In Borole v S132  the appellant appealed his sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment for 
robbery with aggravating circumstances. Counsel for the appellant argued that the court a quo 
did not attach enough weight to the mitigating factors, including the fact that he pleaded 
guilty and in doing so showed remorse.133  The court was of the opinion that the appellant’s 
guilty plea was a neutral factor in the light of the fact that he was arrested shortly after the 
robbery in possession of the stolen goods. The dictum in Matyityi’s case was quoted with 
reference to the distinction between regret and remorse. 
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In S v Mashinini134  the accused were charged with rape. They pleaded guilty to the charge 
and the Regional Court referred them to the High Court for sentencing. They were sentenced 
to life imprisonment in terms of the minimum sentence legislation.135  
The mitigating factors submitted on behalf of the appellants are the following: Both appellants 
were first offenders and have the capacity to be rehabilitated. They were relatively young, as at 
least one of them was 26 years of age when the offence was committed. They pleaded guilty and 
did not waste the court’s time. Their plea of guilty should be regarded as a sign of remorse for their 
deeds. The complainant did not suffer severe physical injuries, albeit the incident would have 
traumatised her. Both appellants had spent 18 months in custody pending the finalisation of the 
trial.136 
The court held that the appellants did not ‘verbalise’ any remorse. It was clear to the court 
that the evidence against both the appellants was ‘overwhelming’ and hence they had no 
choice but to plead guilty. The court went on to find that a plea under those circumstances 
cannot be interpreted as remorse. The aggravating factors were namely, that the complainant 
was fifty-four years old and she was gang-raped in her home; one of the appellants was a 
family member and known to her. Due to an error on the charge sheet in respect of the 
minimum sentence legislation the majority held that the appeal was upheld. The sentence of 
life imprisonment was replaced with a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment. 
   
3.4 Absence of Remorse 
In S v Sesing137  the facts briefly were as follows. The appellant was a thirty-year- old first 
offender and had been convicted in the court a quo of murder and sentenced to death. The 
appellant and another person had attacked the deceased, a sixty eight-year-old lady and her 
husband in their home in Parys. They had robbed the couple and then abducted them to their 
farm where the deceased was shot and killed by the appellant. The court found that the 
murder had been committed during the course of a well-planned and ruthlessly executed 
robbery. It was aggravating that the appellant had throughout treated his victims in a cruel, 
brutal and callous manner. The murder had been committed deliberately and cold-bloodedly. 
The court did not accept remorse as a mitigating factor as the accused had misled the police 
and lied during his plea procedures. The only mitigating factors present were the age of the 
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appellant and that he was a first offender. The court after a consideration of the objects to be 
achieved in the assessment of sentence, namely retribution, deterrence, prevention and 
rehabilitation held that the matter had to be regarded as an extreme case where the elements 
of prevention and retribution were decisive and the death sentence was the only proper 
sentence. The appeal was dismissed. The actions of the accused namely lying to the police 
and lying during the plea procedures was held to be a lack of remorse. 
 
In S v W138 the facts briefly were as follows: The appellant, a public prosecutor, was 
convicted in a regional magistrate’s court of obstructing the course of justice and was 
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, of which two years’ imprisonment were suspended on 
certain conditions. The appellant had undertaken to withdraw a charge against an accused in a 
criminal case on condition that the accused had sexual intercourse with him. The appellant 
withdrew the charge and later handed the case docket to the accused, who tore it up. The 
appellant however did not have sexual intercourse with the accused. 
 
It appeared further that the appellant was 30 years old and was estranged from his wife. He 
was a first offender. His first appeal to the high court succeeded to the extent that his sentence 
was reduced to four years’ imprisonment of which half was suspended. In a further appeal 
against the sentence only, the Court remarked that obstructing the course of justice was a 
serious offence. It was more so in the instant case where the appellant had abused a 
responsible position of trust in order to satisfy his own selfish urges. The court doubted the 
accused’s remorse as he had lied during his evidence in mitigation of sentence.139  The court 
accordingly dismissed the appeal. 
 
In S v GL140  the appellant was charged for killing his wife and obstruction of justice. He was 
convicted on the lesser charge of culpable homicide and obstruction of justice in the Regional 
Court. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for culpable homicide, of which four 
years’ imprisonment was suspended for a period of five years on condition that he was not 
convicted of culpable homicide deriving from an assault upon another person, committed 
during the period of suspension. On the charge of defeating the ends of justice the appellant 
was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for 
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culpable homicide. The court listed various factors that indicated that the appellant was not 
really remorseful. He had initially lied to the police about the crime saying that it was an 
intruder who killed his wife. He pleaded not guilty to murder and contended through- out the 
trial that his defence was one of self- defence. Despite a lapse of more than five years, the 
appellant had not apologised to the family of the deceased. 
 
In S v Stanley141  the appellant was charged with theft of a motor vehicle. He pleaded guilty 
and was convicted in the Regional Court. He was sentenced to six years imprisonment and 
appealed to the Supreme Court. His sentence was set aside and replaced with a sentence as 
follows: 
1. A period of eight months’ imprisonment suspended for one year on condition that 
within the period of suspension the appellant pays compensation to the complainant of 
R10 000 in terms of the provisions of Section 297 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
2. Four years’ imprisonment from which the appellant may be placed under correctional 
supervision in his discretion by the Commissioner in terms of the provisions of section 
276(1) (i) of the Criminal Procedure Act.142 
With leave of the court a quo the appellant appealed to the Appellate Division. The court 
found that the magistrate had carefully balanced the seriousness of the offence with the 
personal circumstances of the accused. The trial court had taken into account that the 
appellant was a first offender and all the character evidence led in mitigation, including a 
glowing testimonial from Gary Player who knew the appellant. They also considered the 
expert evidence of Professor Beyers who testified that he acted out of character and that it is 
unlikely that he will recidivate. The fact that the appellant wanted to compensate the 
complainant for some of his loss was also considered a mitigating factor. The magistrate also 
took into account that the appellant showed true remorse. The court had however found the 
following as aggravating: the prevalence of the offence and that society looked to the courts 
for protection; the offence was premeditated and carefully planned; the appellant had 
impersonated a police officer; his motive was to convert the vehicle for his own benefit. The 
court found that his motive for the theft, namely to impress his parents, was rejected as false. 
Oliver JA stated that ‘He now says that he has remorse, but he did not utilise the opportunity 
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to show regret or contrition until he was arrested by the police.’143 What the court found in 
essence is that if an offender shows remorse only once caught, it may diminish any mitigating 
influence. The appeal was dismissed and sentence merely reformulated to avoid any technical 
issues raised. 
 
In the case of Opperman and another v S144  the appellants were twin brothers convicted of 
two counts of indecent assault and rape. The offences were perpetrated on their six-year-old 
nephew and three-year-old niece. The appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal was in respect 
of the sentences of the rape convictions only, handed down in the High Court. The majority 
of the court held that sentencing is about proportionality. The court referred to the relevant 
factors that must be considered, namely the Zinn triad and prevention, retribution, 
reformation and deterrence. The court had to display sensitivity towards both the victims and 
the accused. The court took into account that the accused had themselves been abused as 
children and the majority opinion was that this accounted for their lack of remorse and insight 
into their offences. The appeal was upheld and their sentences were reduced from twenty five 
years’ for the first appellant and twenty years’ for the second appellant to twelve years’ and 
seven months’. The court took into account the time they had already spent in prison in 
arriving at the appropriate sentence. 
 
In the case of Fakude and others v S145 the court had to deal with the disparity in the 
sentences handed down on all the accused. The accused were convicted in the court a quo of 
the murder of the husband of the first appellant. The first appellant was sentenced to thirty 
five years’ imprisonment, the third and fourth to twenty five years’ and the fifth appellant to 
twenty three years’. The first appellant had conspired to murder her husband and the rest of 
the appellants executed the plan. The deceased was hacked and stabbed to death outside his 
home. The appeal court confirmed that the trial court had taken the Zinn triad into account 
and all the relevant factors thereto. It was argued by the appellants counsel that the absence of 
any kind of remorse was taken as an aggravating factor by the court a quo. Marais JA 
disagreed and stated that ‘[g]enuine remorse is a factor which may mitigate punishment. To 
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remark upon its absence means no more than that, it cannot operate as a mitigating factor.’146 
The absence of remorse had no effect on the ultimate sentence handed down. 
 
In the case of Ngada v S147  it was argued on behalf of the appellant ‘that it was not proper to 
take into account in aggravation of sentence that the appellant showed no remorse for what he 
had done.’148  The High Court found that the dicta in S v Mpite149  and S v Makhudu150  do not 
say that lack of remorse can never be considered in aggravation of sentence. Jones J went on 
to hold that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Makhudu’s case above acknowledges that lack 
of repentance may be relevant to sentence:  
[7] While the behaviour of an accused during the trial may be indicative of a lack of repentance or 
intended future defiance of the laws by which society lives and therefore be a relevant factor in 
considering sentence, neither the fact that an accused’s defence is conducted in an objectionable 
manner nor the fact that the accused’s demeanour in court is obnoxious, is a proper factor to be 
taken into account unless it is of a kind which satisfactorily establishes that the accused is the kind 
of person who would best be deterred from future criminal activity by being dealt with in a firmer 
manner than would have been appropriate if the accused was not that kind of person. 
[8] A court should be slow to jump to conclusions regarding an accused’s character and reaction to 
punishment when such conclusions are based solely upon the accused’s demeanour and behaviour 
in court. 
The judge went on to say  in Ngada’s case: 
the role of absence of remorse in aggravation of sentence must be put in proper perspective. The 
real question is its relevance to the imposition of sentence. This seems to me to be at the heart of 
the passage quoted above from the judgment in Makhudu’s case. Lack of remorse may, for 
example, be relevant to the issue of rehabilitation, the possibility of repeat offences, or the need to 
protect society from the conduct of callous, relentless and remorseless offenders. As Makhudu’s 
case warns us, it is necessary to guard against the danger in, and the potential impropriety and 
injustice of, increasing a sentence because of the way in which a defence is conducted, or because 
of an accused person’s poor demeanour or arrogant behaviour in the witness box or in court. These 
considerations may go hand in glove with a lack of remorse but they will usually be irrelevant. An 
accused person should not, of course, be penalised for exercising his right to plead not guilty, to 
challenge the State evidence, and to require the prosecution to prove his guilt. This does not give 
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him licence to conduct his defence in a vexatious manner. But even if that is what he does, this is 
not necessarily relevant to sentence. 151  
The High Court found that a lack of remorse was indicative of the indifference the appellant 
showed to the victim. 
 
In the case of S v Combrink152  the facts briefly were that the appellant was a farmer who had 
fired two shots at the deceased, a farm worker, believing him to be a trespasser. The second 
shot was fatal. The appellant did not immediately go to assist the deceased. The trial court 
sentenced the accused to 15 years’ imprisonment, of which five years was suspended. The 
appeal court held that the trial court had placed too much emphasis on the mitigating 
circumstances and erred in not balancing them with the aggravating circumstances. The 
appeal court could find no substantial and compelling circumstances to deviate from the 
minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. The trial court had found that the appellant 
had failed to show any remorse as throughout the trial he denied having committed the 
offence. It further found that the appellant’s failure to assist the deceased after shooting him 
was aggravating. Shongwe JA however stated that the appellant’s behaviour was callous in 
having to use a .308 hunting rifle to deal with a ‘suspicious’ person merely walking on the 
farm without posing a threat to anyone.153 
 
In the case of S v SMM154  the appellant was convicted in the high court for the rape of his 
thirteen-year-old niece. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The appeal against the 
conviction was dismissed and the court dealt only with the appeal against the sentence. The 
court took into account the aggravating and mitigating factors in the appeal. The appeal court 
held that it was aggravating that the appellant had abused his position of trust. Specifically in 
respect of remorse, the court held that he showed none by denying in court that the incident 
had taken place. Instead of taking responsibility for his actions, he sought to make the child a 
liar. In effect he victimised her again. After balancing all the principles of sentencing the 
appellant was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 
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In Hatting v S155  the appellant, an attorney, was convicted on multiple counts of fraud, one 
count of theft and one count of money laundering. He was sentenced to an effective twenty 
years’ imprisonment in the Regional Court and appealed his sentence. The court held that the 
trial court had ‘adequately profiled and individualised’ the appellant. The fact that he had 
made full disclosure of his criminal activities, assisted the police, cooperated with the 
prosecution and pleaded guilty to 64 charges were strongly indicative of his genuine remorse. 
However the appeal court stated (at paragraph 36):  
He unwisely tried to trivialise or down-play his powerful position of trust he had with the banks. 
That, in my view, was not only indicative of his complete disregard and disrespect for the trust the 
banks had in him and betrayal of his profession but it was also indicative of the lack of genuine 
remorse. This symbolised his unrepentant stance. Such a stance was telling against him. An 
offender, who shifts blame to his victims, lacks insight into his wrongs. An offender who 
demonstrates such unwillingness to accept full responsibility for the consequences of his unlawful 
actions cannot be regarded as a suitable and [rehabilitative] candidate in the foreseeable future. 
The court found that the aggravating factors far outweighed the appellant’s alleged remorse 
and was more an indication of his ‘remorselessness’. The court went on to quote the dictum 
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ANALYSING THE REMORSE FACTOR 
 
To acquire a better understanding of the court’s interpretation of remorse it is appropriate to 
analyse the various definitions of remorse and then to relate these to the case law.  
 
4.1 The dictionary meaning 
The dictionary meaning of remorse158 defines it as a feeling. It is closely associated with 
regret and guilt. It is a feeling that arises after one has committed a ‘shameful, hurtful or 
violent159’ act. The interpretation of the use of the word remorse in the online examples 
varies. There are clear indications that it is a personal feeling and that expressions of remorse 
can be deduced from the expressions and actions of the person feeling remorse. The signs of 
remorse can be determined by facial expressions. The tone of a person’s voice can indicate 
remorse or a lack of it. Remorse is a feeling which arises in response to a particular situation. 
Taking one’s own life, plunging into a dangerous odyssey and cutting off part of one’s ear are 
the resultant actions indicating remorse.160 
 
4.2 The psychological meaning 
Research in respect of remorse confirms the relationship between remorse, regret, guilt and 
shame. Corwin states that ‘individuals feeling and expressing genuine remorse are believed to 
be enduring emotional pain, usually because of their own behaviour161. Studies have also 
indicated that making a full and detailed confession, taking full responsibility for one’s 
actions and acknowledging one’s wrong are expressions of remorse. An apology with a 
request for forgiveness and a sincere commitment to change or a promise that it will never 
happen again are further indicators of remorse. 
 
Despite Morse’s criticism of Proeve’s and Tudor’s definition of remorse, this definition can 
be useful in trying to define remorse in terms of the psychological context. The definition 
would also be a useful tool in the legal context. By understanding the definition the courts 
may come to a more consistent application of the remorse factor. 
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Remorse may be defined as a distressing emotion that arises from acceptance of personal 
responsibility for an act of harm against another person. Often, with further reflection, the 
remorseful individual may desire that the act had never occurred at all and wish to make restitution 
toward the victim.162 
There is clearly the emotional aspect and the personal acceptance of one’s wrong. Attached to 
it is the feeling of regret and the resultant action to put right what one has done wrong. 
Morse’s criticism is that the aspect of restitution is more closely associated with the feelings 
of regret. He further states that ‘remorseful feelings of regret and guilt need not be distressing 
for the remorse to be genuine.’163 Zhlong’s studies have proven that judges have applied the 
remorse factor inconsistently.164A notable highlight of his research was the difficulties 
experienced by the judges in distinguishing genuine remorse from feigned remorse. The 
question that comes to mind is what indicators are used to make this differentiation and are 
judicial officers in a position to correctly identify remorse? Is a judicial officer in a position 
to assess an accused’s remorse which has been clearly defined as a feeling? The writer hereof 
tends to agree that more research and studies need to be undertaken in order to avoid glaring 
inconsistencies. The expert assistance of forensic psychologists would seem to be the answer 
in assisting courts with an evaluation on the remorse factor. At this stage however the ‘role of 
remorse in the legal system remains unresolved.’165 
 
4.3 The court’s interpretation of remorse: Discussion on the case law 
A recurring theme in the case law is that the accused must take the court fully into his 
confidence in order for the court to assess the sincerity and genuineness of his remorse.166 In 
Seeger’s case the accused pleaded guilty but the court found that his reasons for doing so 
were not sincere. The court found that ‘unless that happens the genuineness of contrition 
alleged to exist cannot be determined.’167 The court found in Morris’s case that remorse was 
absent due to the fact that the accused did not testify in mitigation of sentence. His failure to 
testify resulted in him not taking the court ‘fully into his confidence’ and showed a lack of 
remorse. His guilty plea was found to be a neutral factor as the evidence against the accused 
was overwhelming. The court held in Martin’s case that there was no factual basis for finding 
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true remorse if the accused ‘does not step out to say what is going on in his inner self’.168  
The court will attach very little value to remorse as a mitigating factor even where an accused 
pleads guilty but fails to make a full disclosure.169 The court in Martins case drew a clear 
distinction between remorse and regret. The court was also unable to attach weight to the 
remorse factor as the appellant did not play open cards. Kgantsi’s case is an example of the 
court attaching very little weight to the remorse factor. The conduct of the accused, namely, 
lying in his plea explanation and failing to take the court into his confidence were the reasons 
given by the court. It was held that the sentencing court needs to have a proper understanding 
of what motivated the accused to commit the crime, what has since provoked his change of 
heart, and whether he does indeed have a true appreciation of the consequences of his actions. 
The court reiterated the test as set out in Matyityi. 
 
Simply saying, ‘I am sorry’ is not a sign of remorse. Jeffrie G Murphy sums up an apology as 
follows: 
For small wrongs, of course, the mere verbal formulae “I apologize” or “I am sorry” or “Forgive 
me” or even “Excuse me” are generally adequate. What works for small wrongs is likely to be 
quite unacceptable for wrongs of greater magnitude, however. For grave wrongs, we- both victims 
and spectators- normally expect more- perhaps nothing as extreme as Stavrogin’s suicide (in 
Dostoevsky’s The Devils) or Father Sergius’s cutting off his finger with an axe (in Tolstoy’s story 
Father Sergius), but we expect something more than an apology. We expect such things as 
repentance, remorse (what some medieval call the agenbite of inwit)170 and atonement; and we are 
generally interested in apologies only to the degree that we believe that they are sincere external 
signs of repentance and remorse and reliable indicators of future atonement.171 
The courts as well should be wary in accepting a mere apology as a sign of remorse. The 
signs of repentance and remorse as well as an indication of future atonement should be added 
to the apology. 
 
In Sesing’s case the aggravating factors, which included the seriousness and brutality of the 
offence, far outweighed the mitigating factors. The lack of remorse was attributed to the 
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accused’s actions of lying to the police during the investigations and during his plea 
procedures. In S v W   the court doubted the appellant’s remorse because he had lied while 
testifying in mitigation of sentence. S v GL was also an example of the court doubting the 
appellant’s remorse. Among the factors that the court found indicating a lack of remorse, 
were that the appellant had lied to the police about the details of the crime and had failed to 
apologise to the deceased’s (his wife) family. In S v Stanley the appellant did show remorse. 
He even wanted to compensate the victim partially for his loss. The court found however that 
his show of remorse came too late, only after his arrest. This kind of remorse diminished any 
mitigating influence. In Opperman and another, the court found that the lack of remorse was 
due to the appellants being abused as children. In Fakude’s case the court found that genuine 
remorse is a mitigating factor to be considered. The absence of remorse is neutral and does 
not have an aggravating effect on the final sentence. The appeal court overturned the court a 
quo’s finding that an absence of remorse was aggravating. The decision in Ngada’s case 
confirms the dictum in Opperman’s case. Lack of remorse should not be too easily regarded 
as an aggravating factor. However in quoting the Makhudu and Mpite172 case the High Court 
in Ngada’s case acknowledges that a lack of repentance may be relevant in the sentencing 
process. The High Court in Makhudu’s case links the lack of remorse with the aspects of 
rehabilitation, recidivism and the need to protect society from remorseless offenders. The trial 
court in Combrink’s case found that the appellant showed no remorse as throughout the trial 
he denied having committed the offence. The appeal court found that the court a quo had 
erred in placing too much emphasis on the mitigating factors and not balancing them with the 
aggravating factors. In balancing all the factors the appeal court could find no substantial and 
compelling circumstances to deviate from the applicable minimum sentence legislation. In S 
v SMM the accused was found to have no remorse as he denied that the incident had taken 
place and had failed to take responsibility for his actions. He also sought to make the victim a 
liar and this led to secondary trauma. In Hatting’s case the appellant’s actions such as making 
a full disclosure, assisting the police and prosecution and pleading guilty to sixty four charges 
were signs of genuine remorse. However his downplaying of the offence, abusing his position 
of trust and placing his profession as an attorney into disrepute was seen as a lack of genuine 
remorse. He had shifted the blame to his victims and in doing so demonstrated an 
unwillingness to accept responsibility for his actions. The appeal court saw this as 
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remorselessness. This view is also applied in the case of S v FV 173  where the court held that 
true remorse requires insight into the seriousness of the crime. ‘In this case F accused the 
victims of his child rape of placing him in the predicament he finds himself. Clearly he had 
no true remorse.’174 
 
Terblanche argues that there has been very little discussion supporting the view that lack of 
remorse should be regarded as an aggravating factor.175  The accused, he goes on to say, is 
entitled to his right to plead not guilty and this should not be held against him in the 
sentencing process. Wallis J in S v Mbatha176  held that this clearly points to a ‘constitutional 
problem with our courts’ approach to remorse. He held further that there seems to be 
substantial dangers in inferring an absence of remorse from the exercise of a constitutional 
right and treating that as an aggravating factor.’177  Every accused has a constitutional right to 
plead not guilty and to advance a defence. He or she should not be penalised for exercising 
that right. Makhudu’s case clearly sets out the dangers of a court finding a lack of remorse an 
aggravating factor. 
  
What actions or conduct do our courts recognise as signs of remorse on the part of the 
offender? In S v Volkwyn178  the court held that ” true remorse was deduced from the actions 
of the accused: when confronted with a suspicion he immediately admitted his involvement, 
pleaded guilty, paid certain monies back, let go of monies owed to him by the complainant, 
offered to pay further compensation.”179 The court accordingly took cognisance of the 
accused’s actions to determine the level of his remorse. In S v Xaba180  the court held that the 
accused’s offer to cooperate as well as cooperation already given were factors that were 
considered as genuine remorse.181  A distinction was drawn in Brand’s case where the court 
held that genuine remorse must be distinguished from self-pity and unavoidable 
acknowledgement of guilt.182 The test to arrive at true remorse is whether the offender 
appreciated his wrongfulness and undertook not to transgress again. The appellant’s actions 
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in trying to increase his income to pay back the victim in addition to his guilty plea were 
signs of genuine remorse. In De Sousa’s case the court took into account the following 
conduct as signs of genuine remorse, namely, once discovered the appellant immediately 
undertook to repay the money and signed an acknowledgement of debt; she co-operated fully 
with the police from the outset and gave a detailed statement outlining her involvement with 
her co perpetrator. She had also settled all monies to the victim at the time of her arrest. In De 
Klerk’s case the court found the appellant remorseful as he had taken steps to seek help. The 
expert evidence led on behalf of the appellant showed that he was capable of rehabilitation. In 
M v S the appellant’s lack of remorse was evident from her recidivism. She continued to 
commit similar offences while on bail. Truyens case explicitly sets out the type of conduct 
that the court would consider as a sign of remorse. The appellant had changed his plea, 
accepted responsibility for his actions, wrote to his employer confessing to the crime and he 
paid his employer for the loss suffered. A forensic criminologist testified that the appellants 
conduct was consistent with remorse as it demonstrated his insight into the harm he caused. 
 
In the case of Assante the court had generously discounted the appellant’s guilty plea as a 
mitigating factor. In S v Labuschange183 the court held that the mere fact that an accused 
pleads guilty is not an automatic reflection that the accused is remorseful. In Bercensie’s case 
the court accepted the following as signs of the appellant’s remorse, namely, he expressed his 
remorse in his plea statement, and he pleaded guilty and was willing to testify against his 
accomplice. Despite that finding the court held that remorse on its own does not justify a 
deviation from the minimum sentence. The court has to look at the totality of the evidence in 
determining an appropriate sentence. The judge went on to ask a crucial question. Why do we 
view remorse as a mitigating factor? He answered the question purely from the perspective of 
the propensity of the offender to rehabilitate. He held that a truly remorseful offender is 
unlikely to ever repeat the crime.  
 
The leading test to determine remorse is set out in Matyityi’s case. The court found that there 
must be some factual basis for the court to make a finding of remorse. A plea in the face of an 
open and shut case against the accused is a neutral factor. (S v Barnard)184  The court found 
that it was more ‘likely that the appellant pleaded guilty in view of the fact that he had been 
caught red- handed, and that his actions indicated feeling sorry for himself rather than real 
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remorse.’185 In order for remorse to be a valid consideration, the penitence must be sincere 
and the accused must take the court fully into his confidence. To assess whether the accused 
is genuinely remorseful the court needs to have a proper appreciation of, inter alia: what 
motivated the accused to commit the deed; what has since provoked his or her change of 
heart; and whether he or she does indeed have a true appreciation of the consequences of 
those actions. Thole’s and Baroles case reiterates the view that a plea of guilty is neutral 
when there is overwhelming evidence against an accused. Genuine contrition cannot be 
assumed it must be demonstrated. In S v Mashinini the court held that the appellants did not 
verbalise any remorse. The court found that the evidence against the appellants was 
overwhelming and they did not have any option but to plead guilty. A plea under those 
circumstances cannot be interpreted into remorse. In S v Chipape186  the court held: 
The accused pleaded guilty to the charge and he was convicted on his plea. By this he indicated a 
sign of remorse, which, he in my view, required an element of mercy to be considered. Remember, 
mercy in a criminal court means that justice must be done, but it must be done with compassion 
and humanity, not by rule of thumb, and that a sentence must be assessed not callously or 
arbitrarily or vindictively, but with due regard to the weakness of human beings and their 
propensity for succumbing to temptation. (See S v Van der Westhuizen 1974 (4) SA 61 (C).) The 
accused, having pleaded guilty, took the court into his confidence and told the court during plea 
questioning the circumstances under which the offence was committed. 
The court takes into account that the accused’s plea of guilty is a sign of remorse and plainly 
explains how the element of mercy fits into the sentencing process. The element of mercy 
allows for a tempered discretion on the part of the judicial officer.  
 
4.4 Further views on remorse 
R M Marais in his article states the following: 
An accused person who pleads guilty to a charge laid against him may be actuated by a variety of 
motives in doing so. A genuine sense of repentance and a readiness to take his punishment are but 
two of many. Conceivably he may plead guilty for no other reason than that he is aware that the 
case for the Crown is so overwhelming as to render a plea of not guilty futile. In doing so, he may 
not feel the slightest trace of repentance. Indeed, were it to be accepted that an accused who pleads 
guilty ipso facto exhibits a sense of contrition which entitles a judicial officer to “blend a measure 
of mercy with the justice of punishment” it would be difficult to assail the logical validity of the 
                                                     
185  SS Terblanche ‘ Sentencing’ (2011) 2 SACJ 229  & Matyityi  (note 111above, para 13). 
186 2010 (1) SACR 245 (GNP). 
39 
 
converse, namely, that he who pleads not guilty ipso facto shows a lack of penitence which 
justifies a judicial officer in imposing a heavier sentence than he would have done had the accused 
pleaded guilty.187 
Marais’s argument aptly points to the fact that an offender may plead guilty for many 
reasons. One of them may be that he is remorseful on the other hand he may have had no 
choice because of the overwhelming evidence against him. The court must evaluate the 
reason that an accused pleads guilty. Due weight must be attached if the accused shows 
contrition. However if the offender elects to plead not guilty that cannot automatically be 
regarded as a lack of remorse and hence aggravating which would entail a heavier sentence. 
He adds that a court should be wary of making judgments in respect of an accused’s character 
based solely on the accused’s demeanour and behaviour in court.188  This view has also been 
held in the case of Ngada quoting the dictum in Makhudu’s case. ‘A court should be slow to 
jump to conclusions regarding an accused’s character and reaction to punishment when such 
conclusions are based solely upon the accused’s demeanour and behaviour in court.’189  
Marais critically analyses the judgment in R v Mvelase & others190 and concludes that ‘any 
suggestion by the courts that an accused who pleads guilty is automatically deserving of 
leniency is legally and socially undesirable’191 
 
Tine Vandendriessche argues that the punishment of a remorseful offender is justified in 
certain cases.192  He analyses the theories of punishment in respect of punishing a remorseful 
offender and states that some crimes are more serious than others. He states that when 
someone commits a criminal offence society wishes that person to be punished for what he 
has done. The important questions that follow are: 
[D]o we want the offender to be punished because he broke the law? Do we punish him because he 
will learn through punishment not to do it anymore? Can we justify our harsh treatment of him 
because that’s the best way to reform him? Or do we just put him in prison so society is protected 
from further harm?193 
These are crucial questions in trying to understand a remorseful offender and the manner in 
which he or she is punished. Although a remorseful offender is sorry for what he has done 
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this is not enough when the damage caused by his actions are severe. An example would be 
the loss of life in a murder case. The status quo cannot be restored simply because the 
offender is sorry. Some form of punishment is necessary. 194 Vandendriessche suggests 
looking at Michael Zimmerman’s definition195 in deciding what punishment would be 
suitable, namely, 
looking for something that (1) harms the punishee and (2) intends to do so, (3) that fits the act, (4) 
expresses the disapproval of the offence and the offender and (5) acts in some legally official 
capacity. And maybe the last proposition (5) gives us an answer why the judge’s sentence and not 
that of family and friends has priority, which of course does not mean that it cannot be criticised. 
In understanding, explaining and – if needed – justifying punishment, the remaining problems will 
surround issues of proportionality, mitigating circumstances, (degrees of) responsibility, etc. 
However, I do believe that the theory of symbolic restoration offers us an alternative and plausible 
understanding of our current practice of punishment, which has to be our starting point.196 
Vandendriessche gives an insightful argument above as to why a remorseful offender should 
be punished. The restorative theory he correctly submits should be the starting point. He 
explains this theory as ‘symbolic restoration’.197 Simply put it is trying to restore what was 
lost by the actions of the offender. Sometimes real restoration is impossible (loss of life) and 
that is how we arrive at symbolic restoration. Arnold Burms states that this practice can be 
applied to the ‘practice of punishment’198 and,  
He calls punishment a ‘forced participation at a ritual that wants to restore symbolically what was 
damaged in crime and states that punishment is one of the elaborations of symbolic restoration just 
like remorse is. In fact Burms thinks that remorse is the first form of symbolic restoration after a 
crime because when a criminal repents his deed he is, by repenting, confirming the worth of his 
victim.199 
Remorse does undoubtedly have a role to play in the sentencing process in terms of the 
restorative theory. Genuine remorse, if correctly identified, has benefits for both the accused 
and the victim. 
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4.5 A brief look at some of the international cases  
Conrad Black was convicted of defrauding investors in his company of millions of dollars.200 
Prosecutors requested the harshest possible sentence because his media interviews indicated a 
“stunning lack of remorse”.201  They argued that his failure to acknowledge the offence was 
indicative that he would be a repeat offender.202 
 
Robert Bierenbaum was convicted for the murder of his wife. He had pleaded not guilty and 
maintained his innocence throughout. The judge said, “I can only look at the defendant’s 
cold- blooded behaviour after the fact….He is not rehabilitated- which means accepting, 
admitting and expressing remorse. Only then can one expiate guilt.”203 
 
Julia Apostle204  states that the enquiry into whether someone truly feels regret and contrition 
is a subjective one. A person may lack the skill to articulate remorse due to age or racial and 
cultural backgrounds.205  She quotes a classic example of this in the story of Richard 
Nygaard, a US appeals judge. He had spent eight years on the criminal bench and said the 
following about remorse: 
The accused were often young black men who appeared sullen and arrogant. “I’d think: ‘Who are 
you, to look on this court in this way?’” But he later realised that these were often instances of a 
“person trying desperately to maintain his own dignity, his ‘personhood’, perhaps willing to risk 
the wrath of the court to maintain it”.206 
The danger of inferring remorse merely by demeanour and attitude is abundantly clear from 
the above example. Apostle concedes in her article, with reference to Anglo-American law, 
that the remorse factor has ‘little or no impact’ in the cases of violent crimes. Eisenberg et 
al207 conducted an empirical analysis in capital sentencing cases. Their enquiry was twofold, 
namely, ‘What makes jurors come to believe a defendant is remorseful?’ and ‘Does a belief 
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in the defendant’s remorse affect the jury’s final judgment of life or death?’208 The study 
showed that the  
more jurors think that the crime is cold blooded, calculated and depraved and that the defendant is 
dangerous, the less likely they are to think the defendant is remorseful. Conversely, the less they 
think that the defendant is responsible for the crime, the more likely they are to believe he is 
remorseful. The defendant’s demeanour during the trial also influenced jurors’ beliefs about 
remorse.209  
They further discovered that generally remorse does affect a sentence. ‘Remorse benefits 
some defendants, but not others.’210 The more serious the crime the less affect remorse had 
on the sentencing outcome. The British legal system uses Sentencing Guidelines that 
recognise remorse as a potential mitigating factor.211 Could this be the answer for South 
Africa as well? 
 
4.6 Argument against remorse being a factor in sentencing 
Bryan H Ward argues that remorse should not be relevant in criminal proceedings because its 
application is subjective.212 He points to the difficulties in assessing whether an offender is 
truly remorseful. He makes reference to the offender who may not be remorseful but is 
articulate and proficient in the law and says the right things to convince a judge that he is 
remorseful.213 Conversely the offender who is ‘inarticulate or fails to behave in the manner 
the judge believes indicates remorse’ may be prejudiced and be given a lengthier sentence.214 
He states that the different definitions of remorse is what creates the ‘varying expectations’ 
applicable to a defendant in the criminal process.215 There is the further complication ‘due to 
several factors which inherently make it more difficult to assess the presence or absence of 
remorse: subjectivity, deception, cultural values, developmental limitations and psychological 
problems.’216 It is abundantly evident from his article that the above factors will have a great 
impact in assessing whether remorse is present or not. An apt question that he asks with 
reference to deception is ‘if remorse is a feeling, how can one prove that a defendant is not 
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feeling the way he says he is?’217 This would indeed provide a conundrum for the sitting 
judge. Ward provides logical argument as to how the application of the abovementioned 
factors would inevitably lead to inconsistencies. Even if only one definition of remorse is 
applied there would still be inconsistencies, due to the abovementioned variables, in 
determining the absence or presence of remorse.218 He further criticizes the jury system that 
he argues judge everything by appearance ‘because really that’s all they know.’219 This he 
argues is a totally unreliable method in the sentencing process. His solution is that: 
[W]hether undertaken by judges or juries, sentencing should be a process in which facts are 
assessed by the sentencer for purposes of reaching an appropriate sentence … facts must be 
weighed….Information implies facts—not suppositions. By its very nature, remorse cannot depend 
on a factual determination, but rather relies on guesswork and supposition. 
Ward makes a sound argument why remorse should be ‘eliminated’ from the sentencing 
process and shows in terms of his argument that the process of determining remorse is 
flawed. It is not a factual enquiry and will inevitably lead to prejudice either on the part of the 
criminal defendant or the prosecution. He concludes by submitting that ‘often remorse has 
been used as a justification for enhancing or reducing a sentence based on the ‘gut instincts’ 
of a judge, and nothing more.’220 He extends his argument further and sums up by 
concluding: 
The failure of remorse is simply the failure of [people] to be able read the innermost thoughts and 
feelings of other [people]—an age-old problem which plagues many of mankind’s interpersonal 
relationships. No one really knows what remorse is—and courts certainly don’t seem to know it 
when they see it. Anything that is so intrinsically unknowable cannot fairly be basis for extended 
(or reduced) periods of incarceration in any system of justice.221 
Du Toit222  has a similar view as Ward. He states that ‘any endeavour to detect the presence 
or absence of remorse in surrounding factual circumstances or the genuineness of remorse is 
fraught with [difficulties].’223 He confirms that there are no studies that have proven the link 
between remorse and rehabilitation or remorse and decreased recidivism. He comments on 
the accused that is able to feign his remorse by doing all the right things ‘in an attempt to get 
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a lenient sentence’. He echoes Ward’s sentiments that ‘psychological, developmental and 
cultural factors’ may affect   a remorseful offender from effectively expressing his remorse. 
Both authors have set out tangible arguments with respect to the difficulties in assessing the 







5.1 Understanding the meaning and application of remorse 
There are noticeable distinctions in the manner in which the definition of remorse is 
interpreted. The plain dictionary meaning refers to a feeling. The online examples are more 
indicative of the manner in which one recognizes remorse and they place emphasis on actions 
and expressions as signs of remorse. The actions referred to in those examples are after the 
fact and in response to a wrongdoing. The psychological definition is more in depth and once 
again expresses remorse as a feeling. It then extends the definition to the actions and 
expressions that help us to identify remorse. Herein rests the difficulty as expressed by Ward. 
‘If remorse is an inwardly possessed feeling, as implied by the dictionary definition, one 
might not expect any outward manifestations of it from a criminal defendant.’224 
 
How do our courts interpret these meanings? The courts interpretations vary and the trend 
that emerges from the cases discussed above are as follows: 
 A plea of guilty together with openness, full disclosure (Seegers, Assante), 
cooperation and compensation being paid (Brand, De Sousa, Truyens, S v 
Masielela,225  S v Mushishi 226 , S v Dippenaar227)  has been found to be a sign of 
remorse and hence a mitigating factor.  
 A plea of guilty with no openness (Morris, Martin, Thole) or where the accused lied 
either to the police(Sesing) or during the plea proceedings (Kgantsi) or in mitigation 
of sentence( S v W) or shows signs of recidivism (M v S),  the accused’s remorse 
under these circumstances has been a neutral factor.  
 The exceptions: A plea of guilty, where the accused paid compensation and an expert 
testified that he was remorseful. The court held that remorse was only shown as he 
had been caught by the police. (Stanley)  The other instance was where the accused 
pleaded guilty made a full disclosure and cooperated fully. However his failure to 
accept responsibility for the offence was found to be a lack of remorse (Hatting). 
Remorse was a neutral factor in the above two cases. A ‘genuine, voluntary 
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repayment [has been] valued more highly by the courts.’228 (S v Gardener)229  There 
are cases where undertakings to pay the accused which have not materialised were 
held to be of little mitigating value. (S v Michele)230 
  It is evident in cases where the accused pleaded not guilty and were convicted that 
the courts found a distinct lack of remorse. The reasons for same where inter alia; 
denying the offence (S v GL, Combrink), indifference to the victim (Ngada) and, a 
failure to take responsibility for ones actions(S v SMM). The courts have been 
cautious and in these circumstances the remorse factor has been measured as neutral.  
 
‘Sincere remorse is a factual question and much may be gained from the accused’s action 
after the commission of the crime.’231 The final analysis of the above cases makes it 
abundantly clear that the court assesses remorse or a lack thereof by the actions of the 
accused. This is suggestive of the fact that a judicial officer will not be in a position to 
accurately assess the presence or absence of remorse by judging an inner feeling of the 
accused. Having found remorse in the above cases the court has held it to be mitigating and 
thus favourable to a more lenient sentence. Conversely a lack of remorse has clearly been a 
neutral factor and has had no aggravating effect on the sentence. However the courts have not 
been willing to exclude the possibility that a lack of remorse may be aggravating. ‘Remorse 
should not be confused with the accused feeling sorry for himself for getting caught 
[Stanley], nor should it simply be accepted from what is said in court.’232 
 
5.1.1 The Pistorius sentence 
The long awaited fate of Oscar Pistorius was heard on the 21 October 2014 when the 
sentence was handed down in the Pretoria high court. Judge Masipa addressed the importance 
of applying the principles of the Zinn triad in arriving at an appropriate sentence. She did not 
however delve into the remorse factor in great detail. She found the following factors to be 
mitigating: the accused was a first offender and seems remorseful; she accepted the accused’s 
apology in open court as genuine, and the accused’s conduct after the incident in wanting the 
deceased to live and the accused’s vulnerability.233  The writer’s opinion is that the judge 
erred in not explaining how she found that the accused ‘seemed remorseful’. She made no 
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comment about his demeanour in court in respect of the sobbing and retching. She further 
made no reference about the payments that he made to the deceased’s parents. Needless to 
say she accepted his conduct in respect of his apology and his actions after the incident in 
helping the deceased. Whether these factors were perceived as remorse or whether they were 
assessed independently as mitigating is unclear. It is further unclear whether the remorse 
factor played any role in arriving at the final sentence. The accused was sentenced as follows: 
1. Count 1- culpable homicide: The sentence imposed is a maximum imprisonment of 5 years 
imposed in terms of Section 276(1) (i) of the Criminal Procedure Act, number 51 of 1977. 
2.On count 3- The contravention of section 120(3) (b) of the Firearms Control Act, number 60 of 
2000: the sentence imposed is 3 years imprisonment, wholly suspended for 5 years on condition 
that within the period of suspension the accused is not found guilty of a crime where there is 
negligence involving the use of a firearm. 
3. The sentence in count 1 and the sentence on count 3 shall run concurrently.234 
The state has appealed the judgment and sentence. It will be very interesting to hear the 
appeal courts views in respect of the remorse factor. It is evident that clarity is warranted in 
respect of this particular factor. 
 
5.2 Difficulties with interpreting remorse 
Research conducted during this dissertation has shown that there are difficulties that arise 
from interpreting the true meaning of remorse. The main obstacle in trying to come to grips 
with remorse was the lack of empirical data and discussion on this topic. There have been no 
studies or in depth research done specifically in South Africa. Proeve and Tudor’s235  study 
referred to above, despite its limitations, may have proved useful in assessing our judges’ 
views on remorse. Zhong’s conclusions were that despite his study ‘and other empirical 
findings, the relevance of remorse remain controversial in legal reasoning.’236  Bearing this in 
mind the writer is of the view that our courts are correct in either accepting remorse as a 
neutral or mitigating factor. If they were to find it aggravating in cases were the accused 
pleaded not guilty this would lead to an infringement of the accused’s constitutional rights. 
An accused ‘is fully entitled to plead not guilty, to challenge the prosecution to prove his 
guilt, and to attack in cross examination the witnesses’ versions of events. This should never 
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be held against him when sentence is imposed.’237  The writer is further of the view that the 
factors which the court identifies as indicative of remorse can be dealt with independently.  
 
5.3 Possible solutions to the ‘inconsistency’ problem 
Terblanche and Roberts238  criticise the ‘current sentencing scheme used in South African 
law’. Their main objection is that the application of the present principles does not lead to 
‘consistent outcomes’. They have recommended solutions in order to assist the court achieve 
consistency in their outcomes. In summary their recommendations are as follows: 
1. There must be a separation of the fact- finding phase of the post-conviction trial process    
from the decision-making stage. 
2. Within the limits of the adversarial system the courts should as far as possible obtain all 
necessary evidence and base it’s decisions on facts rather than conjecture. 
3. During the sentencing process expert evidence should be accepted as factual information, 
if it has not been refuted. 
4. The seriousness of the offence must be the starting point in assessing the severity of the 
sentence. The criteria that have been advanced are similar to the ones recommended by the 
South African Law Commission,239  namely the harm caused or risked by the offence, and 
the offender’s culpability with respect to that harm. 
5. Due to the current conditions of our prisons and the problem of overcrowding there should 
be a policy of restraint in respect to custodial sentences. Basically recommending that a 
sentence of imprisonment should be a last resort as a sentencing option as it deprives an 
offender of his basic right to liberty as enshrined in our Bill of Rights.240 
 
The above recommendations have been well formulated by the authors and provide a viable 
solution to the glaring inconsistencies in the law of sentencing. In applying these 
recommendations to the remorse factor one would have to agree with Ward and Du Toit that 
remorse should have no effect on the sentencing process. Firstly the judicial officer is not in a 
position to factually determine an offender’s remorse. His determination of the absence or 
presence of remorse would be from a ‘gut instinct’.241  The expert evidence of forensic 
psychologists may assist the court in assessing an offender’s remorse but they will have to be 
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suitably trained and experienced in this specific field. The seriousness of the offence should 
be assessed independently of any feelings of remorse that the offender experiences after the 
wrongdoing. ‘At present in South Africa, determining whether imprisonment has become 
unavoidable is squarely within the discretion of the sentence.’242 Terblanche states that the 
traditional approach is that the court should ignore prison conditions when it imposes 
sentence.243 However ‘[as] the conditions of overcrowding in the country’s prisons [increase] 
this question is increasingly on the mind of presiding officers.’244  A judicial officer has to be 
mindful of infringing on accused ‘rights to dignity’ as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.245 
 
The writer hereof agrees with Du Toit that the following factors per se are mitigating on their 
own, namely, ‘pleading guilty, co-operation with the authorities and paying compensation to 
a victim’.246 These factors he avers, if present, do result in the ‘effective administration of 
justice and serve the interests of the victim and the community.’ In England and Wales courts 
have to reduce a sentence when an offender pleads guilty.247 The reasons are simple and 
logical. The courts time is not wasted, the costs are reduced and complainants avoid the 
trauma of having to testify.248 Du Toit argues further that it is unfair not to regard a guilty 
plea as a mitigating factor where the evidence is overwhelming as many South African 
accused choose to plead not guilty despite this fact249, which is their constitutional right to do 
so. Du Toit elaborating on his argument confirms the situation where a case with 
overwhelming evidence may turn out to be otherwise and an apparently flimsy case may turn 
out to be overwhelming.250 He concludes by saying that ‘[we] simply know too little about 
the concept of remorse to use it as an indicator of anything.’251  
 
The solution to consistency in South Africa’s law of sentencing may be the enactment of the 
sentencing guidelines as recommended by the South African Law Commission. The 
Commission found that these guidelines: 
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should be seen to promote consistency in sentencing, deal appropriately with concerns that 
particular offences are not being regarded with an appropriate degree of seriousness, allow for 
victim participation and restorative initiatives and, at the same time produce sentencing outcomes 
that are within the capacity of the state to enforce in the long term252 
Terblanche253 submits that we could learn a great deal from the guidelines used in other 
countries. Perhaps the example of Britain, where the aspect of remorse is factored in as a 
guideline, could be useful in assisting our courts as well. If remorse is going to stay as a 
factor in the sentencing process it would be imperative that the courts consider the use of 
experts in the assessment of same. This would alleviate the discrepancies between genuine 
and feigned remorse and lead to more just sentences. 
 
5.4 The role of remorse in the restorative justice process 
Remorse will have a meaningful role to play in the restorative justice process. ‘Restorative 
justice requires the restoration of victims of crime to the position they were in before the 
crime was committed’.254 The court in Matyityi’s case above reminds us that ‘[by] giving the 
victim a voice the court will have an opportunity to truly recognise the wrong done to the 
individual victim.255  Ponnan JA held that: 
 
In South Africa victim empowerment is based on restorative justice. Restorative Justice seeks to 
emphasize that a crime is more than the breaking of the law or offending against the state- it is an 
injury or wrong done to another person.256 
By accommodating the victim during the sentencing process the court will be better informed 
before sentencing about the after effects of the crime. The court will thus have at its disposal 
information pertaining to both the accused and victim and in that way approach hopefully a more 
balanced approach to sentencing can be achieved.257 
Restorative justice is a process of mediation whereby all parties including the victim and 
offender ‘focus on repairing the harm committed against the victim’ and also to assist the 
offender ‘to identify what needs to change to prevent re- offending.’258 A remorseful offender 
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would take responsibility for his or her actions and this would ultimately aid in the healing 
process. The process ‘must promote healing and restitution.’259 
 
The remorse factor should not be written off in the sentencing process. Further research and 
studies will enable the courts to understand the concept and interpret it consistently. Applying 
the ‘gut instinct’ approach as to whether an accused is remorseful will invariable lead to 
inconsistent and unjust outcomes. There is the additional problem of an accused being aufait 
with what a judge may consider being remorse and then attend to act it out in order to receive 
a more lenient sentence. There is also the scenario where an accused may be truly remorseful 
but due to cultural or psychological reasons he or she is unable to outwardly display remorse. 
Ultimately sentencing guidelines will minimise the current position of inconsistencies and 
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